Storm Clouds Gathering Over Raisina Hill?

Waiting to exhale!

There’s a storm brewing in the Ministry of External Affairs.

Rarely have I seen the Foreign Service in such a twist. And not without cause, if the reasons they cite are anything to go by.

Most of their ire, so far is aimed across Raisina Hill, at the Ministry of Home Affairs. In particular, P Chidambaram, the Home Minister, who most in the MEA feel, has become a law unto himself.

“I knew he was arrogant and liked to rule over his minions,” an MEA official told me, “But now his arrogance has begun to affect the credibility of the country.” He was talking about the series of ridiculously embarrassing blunders in the list of India’s 50-most wanted, that had been handed over to Pakistan with much flourish. “Together with the Samjhauta case on a platter in the name of India’s ‘secular’ credentials, we have completely lost our credibility and cannot hold Pakistan convincingly accountable for anything in the future,” he said, adding, “Such was the arrogance of Chidambaram, that he did not even bother to consult the MEA on the list before it was handed over to Pakistani officials. Today, there is not a single of his officers who is willing to speak up. Such is his lordship’s impact,” he added.

A lot of the frustration within the MEA is also about being caught with too many masters to be accountable to. From day-1 in UPA-II, it’s been the norm that the PMO takes the big calls on India’s external relations. In fact, at his first press interaction after taking oath as External Affairs Minister in UPA-II, I asked SM Krishna what his mandate was, because the road-map and decision making process of the MEA had been taken over by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. His answer was a wry one. He said: “My job is to play second fiddle to the Prime Minister”. That answer did send attending IFS officers into a bit of a fiddle, but Krishna had hit the nail on the head. With Pranab Mukherjee moving ministries, Krishna wasn’t expected to be ‘strong enough’ to chart India’s foreign policy agenda. It was even more disconcerting then, to see 2 Ministers of State being added to the MEA, when the Minister himself had little work to dispense.

Things became further complicated for Foreign Service officers, when former Foreign Secretary Shivshanker Menon was appointed National Security Advisor. The highly respected and admired IFS officer, though accepted as the best man for the job, would in time come to further overshadow the MEA. Not that he’s making any wrong moves like Chidambaram.

But when all these factors that affecting the MEA are put together, they focus the spotlight on a weakened and frustrated Foreign Service cadre. The same cadre that serves as the first line of engagement with foreign governments. The same cadre that will have to engage with the Pakistanis at the end of the month, during talks on the Siachen issue.

More disconcerting however, are the indications of a an increasingly weakening PMO. Citing an example to this effect, another senior official in the MEA told me: “Look at the manner in which Chidambaram went against the PMO’s decision to grant former Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf a visa recently. The PMO decided to grant him a visa, but Chidambaram rejected it, saying, ‘My conscience does not allow it.’ Even the PMO was over-ruled without a second thought.”

Another MEA official recounted the embarrassment within the PMO, over ignorance that a letter of rejection had been sent to US bidders Boeing and Lockheed Martin, in the MMRCA deal. It was only when the Americans expressed themselves rather plainly, that the PMO came to know of the Defense Ministry’s decision.

And perhaps the most embarrassing example of just how shoddy and ill-prepared the Home Ministry has made us appear in our transactions with Pakistan, is what happened at the recent India-Pakistan Home Secretary level talks in March. Home Secretary GK Pillai and his team were pressing for a ‘Judicial Commission’ on the Mumbai Terror Attacks to visit Pakistan for further investigations, when the Interior Secretary of Pakistan, Qamar Zaman Chaudhary pointed out that India hadn’t laid the requisite legal groundwork to warrant a ‘Judicial’ Commission, even though Pakistan was willing to accept such a demand. As a consequence, a highly embarrassed Indian side had to hurriedly drop the word ‘Judicial’ from the joint press release and state that India would send a plain ‘Commission’ to Pakistan instead. The text from the Joint Statement issued on March 29, 2011, is pasted below:

“7. Pakistani side provided updates on the ongoing trial and investigation in Pakistan on the Mumbai Terror Attacks. Pakistan conveyed its readiness, in principle, based upon the principle of comity and reciprocity, to entertain a Commission from India with respect to Mumbai Terror Attack investigations. Modalities and composition in this connection will be worked out through diplomatic channels. Dates for the visit of the Judicial Commission from Pakistan in connection with Mumbai attack trial will be conveyed by India within four-six weeks. NIA and FIA will continue to cooperate in the Mumbai Terror Attack investigations.”

It’s getting stormy on the hill. Now wonder when and where lightning will strike.

India’s Jammu Kashmir Problem – A Self Goal

The absence of a strategic culture in India, is largely responsible for a lack of strategic vision and a failure to integrate military power into the state policy, as one of its instruments.  This has been the bane of our foreign policy.  Nowhere it is manifested more, than in our J&K policy – or the lack of it.  So, this festering sore is slowly bleeding us with no solution in sight.

Our leadership tended to see the princely state of J&K as just one of 565 princely states of India.  They were not much concerned if at the time of independence, the J&K state opted for Pakistan.  They failed to see its strategic location and consequently its strategic importance.  The result was that a series of mistakes were made prior to, and after independence, which turned the J&K problem into such a long running saga.

Realpolitik vs Idealism: The J&K state would have acceded to India long before the tribal invasion from Pakistan, if Nehru had not insisted that the Maharajas release Sheikh Abdullah from jail and install him as the Chief Minister before he acceded to India.  He failed to realise that national interest must not be held hostage to an individual. Similarly, agreeing to a Britisher – Lord Mountbatten – becoming the head of state of independent India, proved to be an act of misplaced friendship.  This went on to the extent that Mountbatten started presiding over the meetings of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, instead of Nehru, who, as Prime Minister was the head of the government.  There cannot be a better example of abdication of responsibility and misplaced trust.  Similarly, accepting British Generals as C-in-C India and also C-in-C India-Pakistan, was another mistake.  The invasion of J&K was planned by GHQ Pakistan, whose C-in-C kept his Indian counterpart fully informed and consequently Mountbatten knew exactly what was going on.  And let us not forget that it was Mountbatten who inserted the mischievous clause of plebiscite in his reply to the signed Instrument of Accession by Maharaja Hari Singh. The British were playing their game of divide and rule to perfection.

Armed Forces as an Instrument of State Policy: Indian leaders never understood that a nation is not respected for its moral stance, but the might of its armed forces.  But for Pakistan’s invasion of J&K, Nehru would have gladly disbanded the Armed Forces.  Indeed, he said so to the C-in-C India, General Sir Robert Lockhart.  When the C-in-C went to the Prime Minister to get approval for a defence policy paper, Nehru glanced through the paper but wasn’t in the least bit amused.  “Rubbish, total rubbish.  We don’t need a defence policy.  Our policy is Ahimsa.  We foresee no military threats.  As far as I am concerned, you can disband the Army.  The police are good enough to meet our security needs.”

Nehru had an innate distrust of the Armed Forces and he was brought up in the atmosphere of Ahimsa by the Father of the Nation.  Neglect of the Armed Forces cost him and the nation dear in the 1962 war against China.  Sadly, distrust of the Armed Forces continues and they are excluded from the decision making loop even today.

Conduct of Operations – British Subterfuge: The British effort at all times was to make sure the Indian forces did not prevail over the Pakistani invaders, and since the C-in-C Indian Army was a Britisher who was in daily touch with his counterpart, this was easily done.  The Indian leadership, with no knowledge of fighting a war, did not understand the implication of orders being passed to the Indian Army.  Two examples will suffice.  Once the raiders were routed at Shalateng on 07 November 1947, and Uri recaptured on 13 November 1947, the 161 Infantry Brigade was riding the crest of success and was all set to advance up to Muzaffarabad.  This had to be stopped somehow.  So the axis of advance of the 161 Infantry Brigade was changed, and they were told to link up with Poonch over the Haji Pir Pass.  This halted their momentum, and the raiders and the Pakistan Army was able to regroup.

Similarly, during the 1948 summer offensive, urgent pleas by Maj Gen Thimayya – the force commander for reinforcements – were ignored, with the result that a stalemate came about, which continues till date.  The point being made and India has had to pay dearly for putting their trust in a British Viceroy and a British C-in-C.  How could we be so naïve?

Referring the J&K Issue to the UN – The Biggest Blunder: The British, having ensured that the Pakistani forces are not driven out of J&K, then played their master card. Mountbatten persuaded Nehru that the J&K issue needs to be referred to the UN.  This was the biggest mistake made by the Indian leadership.  A bilateral issue was therefore allowed to become a world problem.  At the UN, the British ensured that India gets equated with Pakistan, the aggressor. The legality of J&K’s accession to India was completely ignored.

The UN Resolutions and our Stance: The August 13 resolution of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) had three parts.  Part I asked both nations to observe a ceasefire, Part II asked Pakistan to remove its irregular and regular forces from J&K and Part III laid down that once that happens and normalcy returns, plebiscite should be conducted.  The resolution was accepted by both countries.  Now, it should be obvious to even a moron that the plebiscite could only be held when Pakistan withdrew its forces.  We should have been concentrating on asking Pakistan to vacate J&K in its entirety.  We have not done it till date.  There was no reason to go on the defensive about the plebiscite.  Instead, after some time, we started trashing the Resolution, and claiming that since elections have been held in J&K, the UN Resolution is null and void.  No one in the world was willing to listen to this.  We should have been harping on Part II of the Resolution day-in-and-day-out, like Pakistan, who only harp on Part III and never mention Part II.  This has been the biggest policy blunder on the part of India and it is yet to be corrected.

Subsequent Mistakes: Having blundered our way as far as the UN Resolution was concerned, more was on the way.  Having categorically stated that the J&K problem was a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan, at the end of the 1965 war, we accepted Russian mediation, thus weakening our own case.  No wonder Pakistan insists on some mediation – whether by UN, US or anybody else.  Thereafter, whenever J&K is discussed with Pakistan, instead of asking Pakistan categorically to vacate POK and the Northern Areas, we allow it to set the agenda.  For example, why should there be separate talks on Siachen? It is a part of J&K and if we say that J&K is part of India, we only need to tell Pakistan to take a walk.  By agreeing to talks on Siachen, we are weakening our own case.

The other issue is of treating the J&K problem as real. We tend to bury our heads in the sand and say that it is not a problem.  If Pakistan says J&K is a problem between India and Pakistan, we should say it is one created by Pakistan and there is only one solution and that is to comply with the UN Resolution of 13 August 1948, which was agreed to by Pakistan.  Instead, we become coy, and refuse to be upfront about it.  In other words, we lack a pro-active policy.  The result is that we have not been able to convince the world of our genuine case on J&K.  Most of the world believes that we are in J&K by force.

Internal Policy with Respect to J&K: Our internal policy on J&K – if indeed there is one – lacks focus, coherence and clarity.  We have failed to convey to the people of J&K, its political parties and separatists, our strong resolve that the entire J&K state, including POK and the Northern Areas, is a part of India.  Instead of dealing with them firmly, we invite separatists like the Huriyat Conference for talks, them giving them legitimacy.  There is no resolve to end cross border terrorism by Pakistan.  The option of taking out known camps in POK by surgical air strikes was not considered even during the Kargil war. Instead, we imposed the condition on the Army and Air Force, not to cross the Line of Control.  We want to set up a joint terror mechanism with Pakistan, the very country which is the epicenter of terrorism the world over.  We keep giving 26/11 dossiers to Pakistan so that they can tie up their Standard Operating Procedures and next time make sure there is no linkage of terrorists with Pakistan.  Our bright Foreign Office mandarins include Indian involvement in Balochistan in the joint statement at Sharm-el Sheikh and no one is held accountable.  An Indian head of government boards a bus and lands in Pakistan without invitation and suffers gladly the insult of Pakistan Service Chiefs not being there in the reception party.  We run to the USA whenever there is a terror strike.  No nation which has aspirations to become an Asian, and later a global power, can do this.  We have to deal with the problem ourselves.

Crystal Gazing: Going by our past record and present blundering, it does not need a genius to predict that the J&K problem is unlikely to be resolved in our lifetime.  Instead of trashing Pakistan as a failed state, we need to learn something from them as far as focus and perseverance is concerned.  Their terror factory continues irrespective of which government is in power, and their resolve to Balkanise India stands fast.  If a failed state can cause us so much of grief, what would have happened if Pakistan were not a failed state? But for the Armed Forces, J&K would have long become Pakistani territory and the same Armed Forces are treated with contempt by successive governments. How can things improve?

THE AUTHOR IS MAJ GEN (RETD) SHERU THAPLIYAL, SM